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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills, 
trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of sections of 
the Virginia Code in its 2006 Session. In addition, there were six 
opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia during the period 
covered by this review that presented issues of interest to the 
general practitioner as well as the specialist in wills, trusts, and 
estates. This article reports on all of these legislative and judicial 
developments. 1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A. Persons Presumed Dead-Chapter Revision 
Chapter 5 of Title 64.1, dealing with persons presumed dead 
following a disappearance exceeding seven years in the typical 
case, or following certain specified events in other cases, came be-
fore the General Assembly in the 2002 Session when it was 
amended to provide an accelerated remedy for the successors in 
interest of persons "documented to have been in that portion of 
the Pentagon damaged by the terrorist attack of September 11, 
2001, or on American Airlines Flight 77 on September 11, 2001, 
when it was flown into the Pentagon."2 Chapter 5 returned in the 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, the sec-
tions will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise 
stated, those section numbers will refer to the most recent version of the section to which 
reference is being made. 
2. Act of Feb. 28, 2002, ch. 58, cl. 1, 2002 Va. Acts 51. This legislation, which was en-
acted as"§ 1," was not codified in the Virginia Code. However, its text does appear in an 
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2003 Session when a generic "specific peril" exception was added 
to the seven-year rule to provide an accelerated remedy in cases 
resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks that occurred at the 
World Trade Center in New York and aboard United Airlines 
Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, as well as in any other 
case where one disappears after having been "exposed to a spe-
cific peril of death."3 The attention drawn to this area of law in 
the 2002 and 2003 Sessions disclosed a number of problems 
throughout Chapter 5, which prompted the Wills, Trusts and Es-
tates Section of the Virginia Bar Association to undertake a sev-
eral-year study that led to the passage of comprehensive legisla-
tion in the 2006 Session that is designed to completely revise and 
reform this body oflaw. 
Although a detailed explanation of the 2006 legislation is not 
feasible within the confines of this annual review, a listing of the 
major changes would include the following: (1) All fact situations 
that would permit a determination of presumed death are now 
consolidated into Virginia Code section 64.1-105; 4 (2) A new sec-
tion, Virginia Code 64.1-106.1, authorizes the appointment of a 
curator to manage the estate of a person who has been missing 
for one year, and who cannot be shown to be alive, until the pre-
sumption of death is made out; 5 (3) The chapter's language is 
clarified to ensure that its provisions, which originally focused 
mostly on probate related considerations, will also apply to survi-
editor's note appended to Virginia Code section 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 2002). This legislation 
is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Es-
tates, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 357, 367-68 (2002). 
3. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 254, 2003 Va. Acts 276 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 64.l-105(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). This legislation is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, 
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 300-
01 (2003). 
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Virginia Code section 64.1-105.1 
(Rep!. Vol. 2002), dealing with the presumption of death in cases of persons disappearing 
in floods resulting from Hurricane Camille, was repealed because it was believed to no 
longer serve any purpose, and the substance of Virginia Code section 64.1-105.2 (Repl. Vol. 
2002), dealing with the presumption of death in cases of persons disappearing from a ship 
at sea or on board an aircraft that disappears at sea, was moved to Virginia Code section 
64.1-105(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
5. Id. § 64.1-106.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006). This section further provides that "[i]n deter-
mining good cause hereunder, the court shall take into account the existence and efficacy 
of any durable power of attorney." Id. It should also be noted that there is some overlap 
between this remedy and the one provided by Chapter 6 of Title 26, entitled "Conservators 
of Property of Absentees." Id.§§ 26-68 to -71 (Repl. Vol. 2004). This will provide the suc-
cessors in interest of a missing person with several options when determining the best 
way to obtain relief under the unique facts of a particular case. 
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vorship property, insurance, and other beneficiary designations, 
etc.;6 (4) The failure of existing law to address the time of a per-
son's presumed death in any case is cured by providing a specific 
date of death provision for each of the different instances of pre-
sumptive death; 7 and (5) The problems raised by the absence of 
any provision for the issuance of a death certificate in presump-
tive death cases are eliminated by new language that "[a] certi-
fied copy of the court's order determining that the supposed dece-
dent is in fact dead shall be accepted as proof of death in all 
situations in which a certificate of death" would be accepted. 8 Fi-
nally, an unfortunate aspect of prior law was the rule that effec-
tively prevented a missing person's successors in interest from re-
ceiving distribution of that person's estate for a period of fifteen 
years in many if not most cases, regardless of whether the deter-
mination of presumptive death was based upon a seven-year ab-
sence or upon a disappearance following an exposure to a specific 
peril. Although no such express rule was contained in the stat-
utes, the requirement of Virginia Code section 64.1-112 that, fol-
lowing the court's determination that the presumption of death 
has been established, the successors in interest must post a re-
funding bond with surety prior to receiving distribution if the ab-
sence was less than fifteen years had the same practical effect-
because no surety company would write such a bond in these 
cases. 9 The 2006 legislation completely eliminates this problem 
by providing for the successors in interest to post a refunding 
bond "without" surety. 10 
6. See, for example, Virginia Code section 64.1-108 (Cum. Supp. 2006), which incor-
porates the substance of Virginia Code section 64.1-109 (Rep!. Vol. 2002), prior to its re-
peal. 
7. Id.§ 64.1-lll(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
8. Id.§ 64.1-lll(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
9. Id. § 64.1-112 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). In such cases, the statute provided for the assets 
to be invested pursuant to court order with the "interest" arising therefrom to be paid an-
nually to the successors in interest. The statute further provided that "[t)he investment 
shall continue until security is given, as aforesaid, or the court, on application, orders it to 
be paid to the persons appearing to be entitled to it." Id. It is unclear whether the latter 
part of the preceding sentence refers to the court entering an order during or following the 
fifteen-year period. Even if a court should be willing to interpret it as "during" this period, 
conventional judicial discretion would still not guarantee a distribution. 
10. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
324 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:321 
B. Inter Viuos Trusts-Tenancy by the Entirety-Any Property 
The form of concurrent ownership known as the tenancy by the 
entirety, which can exist only between a husband and wife, is the 
most popular form of real estate ownership for married couples in 
Virginia. The primary reason for this popularity is the common-
law immunity of such property from the claims of the individual 
(but not the joint) creditors of the husband and the wife. 11 How-
ever, married couples who decided to base their estate planning 
upon an inter vivos trust were unable to obtain any benefit from 
this common-law immunity prior to July 1, 2000, because of the 
rule that realty owned by a trust was not owned by a husband 
and wife, even if the husband and wife were its grantors, trus-
tees, and beneficiaries. Responding to this perceived inequity, the 
2000 Session broke new ground by amending Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-20.1 to enable a husband and wife to convey certain ten-
ancy by the entirety real estate to "their joint revocable or irrevo-
cable trust, or in equal shares to their separate revocable or 
irrevocable trusts" without losing its tenancy by the entirety 
status. 12 However, the only real estate that might be so protected 
was their "principal family residence," that was held by them as 
tenants by the entireties prior to its conveyance to the trust, and 
this protection will last only "so long as (i) they remain husband 
and wife, (ii) it continues to be held in the trust or trusts, and (iii) 
it continues to be their principal family residence."13 
The 2006 Session broadened the language of this provision 14 by 
(1) eliminating its restriction to the "principal family residence" 
and providing instead for its applicability to "[a]ny [of their] prop-
erty,"15 (2) deleting the requirement that a conveyance to H's and 
11. See Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999). 
12. Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 331, 2000 Va. Acts 473 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000)). 
13. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000). See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Sur-
vey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2000), 
from which this paragraph was taken, mutatis mutandis, for additional citations of au-
thority. 
14. This provision was moved from Virginia Code section 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000) 
to Virginia Code section 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001) by the 2001 Session as a part of a 
revision of the statutes governing concurrent ownership and survivorship. This develop-
ment is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 849-51 (2001). 
15. Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 281, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). One potentially fertile field of litigation may arise 
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Ws separate revocable or irrevocable trusts must be "in equal 
shares," and (3) replacing the durational limitation on the credi-
tor immunity of conveyed property from so long as it continues to 
be "their principal family residence," to so long as it continues to 
be "their property."16 
Notwithstanding the common law principle that tenants by the 
entirety hold per tout et non per my, 17 one of the modern social 
hallmarks of the tenancy by the entirety is the assumed equality 
of ownership between husband and wife (an expression of the 
partnership theory). This will no longer be true when tenancy by 
the entirety property is conveyed to lI's and Ws separate trusts 
in shares that could range, for example, from 0.1 % to 99.9% and, 
query, whether it is good public policy for the tenancy by the en-
tirety's historic creditor immunity, which was based upon lI's and 
Ws "equal" ownership, to continue under these circumstances?18 
The amendment also raises a substantive concern in regard to the 
new durational language limiting creditor immunity of trans-
ferred property to "so long as . . . it continues to be their prop-
erty."19 Suppose, for example, Hand W create a trust providing 
for themselves for their lives and for their children or others 
thereafter. Depending upon the language used, the remainder 
beneficiaries may have vested or contingent interests but, in both 
cases, they will have a legally recognized ownership interest. In 
such a case, does the tenancy by the entirety property conveyed to 
the trust "continue to be their [i.e., lI's and Ws] property?"20 Or, 
will the protection of the new rule be construed by the courts to 
be limited to trusts where H and W are the only beneficiaries, 
in those cases where H conveys separate property to Hand Was tenants by the entirety, 
and they immediately reconvey the same to their trust. The claim that the original con-
veyance was intended to "hinder, delay, or defraud" Hs creditors would appear to be more 
likely in those cases where H's and W's conveyance is to separate trusts with Hs trust re-
ceiving a much greater portion of the property. 
16. Id. 
17. "By the whole and not by the half." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1181 (8th ed. 2004). 
18. The equality principle was sufficiently important to the 2000 Session for it to re-
quire that, if the principal family residence were to be conveyed to separate trusts of hus-
band and wife, it must be conveyed to them "in equal shares." VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-20.2(B) 
(Repl. Vol. 2003). 
19. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2006). Of course the legal title to the property will not be theirs 
following its conveyance to the trust, but it is assumed that this language will be inter-
preted as applicable to the equitable or beneficial ownership. 
20. This was not a concern under the statute as previously written because the fact 
that others might have an ownership interest in the trust holding legal title to Hs and W's 
home would not prevent the home from "continuing to be their principal family residence." 
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which would be the direct parallel to the original tenancy by the 
entirety? Regardless of one's preferred interpretation, it is doubt-
ful whether the prudent estate planner will act upon this new 
provision until its operation has been clarified by further legisla-
tion. 
If this legislation should be reconsidered, it is hoped that some-
one might inquire why it was cast in the tenancy by the entirety 
format in the first place. If its purpose was simply to confer credi-
tor immunity upon the property of married persons, insofar as 
their separate creditors are concerned, why not say so directly 
without the unnecessary involvement and confusion of the ten-
ancy by the entirety concept? Further, why should it be required 
that married persons' property must be put into a trust in order 
to obtain the desired creditor immunity? Such a requirement will 
be benefit to married couples who wish to insulate their property 
from the claims of their separate creditors, and it discriminates 
against those whose estate plans are will-based. Although cer-
tainly not so intended, this legislation clearly has the potential 
for abusive use in the continuing struggles between debtors and 
creditors and it may even breathe new life into a 400-year-old 
"badge of fraud" from the common law. 21 Conceptually, a statute 
could be drafted to attain the assumed creditor protection goal, 
without involving either trusts or the tenancy by the entirety, by 
providing something like: "Neither the separate nor the joint 
property of persons married to each other, whether held by them 
outright or for them in their separate or joint trusts, is subject to 
the claims of their separate creditors." Such a provision would 
also be more democratic in operation because its benefits would 
be automatically applicable to all married persons, whereas the 
benefits of the 2006 trust-based legislation will be disproportion-
ately utilized by the carriage trade. 
21. The term "badges of fraud" is considered to have originated in Twyne's Case, 3 Co. 
Rep. 80a, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601). "The 5th sign of fraud mentioned in Twyne's case, 
3 Co. 81. (b) is, that there 'was a trust between the parties; for the donor possessed all, and 
used them as his proper goods, and fraud is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a 
trust is the cover of fraud.'" United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73, 80 (1805). 
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C. Probate Avoidance-Small Estate Act 
Virginia's well-intentioned Small Estate Act22 ("Act") has been 
hobbled by its very low ceiling since its enactment in 1981.23 Al-
though the Act's original $5,000 ceiling has been increased to 
$15,000,24 which is also the ceiling in most of Virginia's other pro-
bate avoidance statutes, the Act differs from these other statutes 
because of the Act's "umbrella" operation as opposed to the other 
statutes' "asset-specific" operation such as, for example, those ap-
plying to deposits in banks, 25 deposits in savings institutions, 26 
deposits in credit unions, 27 securities of a corporation, 28 etc. The 
Act creates a collection by affidavit process that encourages third-
party cooperation by providing that one who makes a transfer of 
personal property thereunder will be "discharged and released to 
the same extent as if he dealt with a personal representative of 
the decedent."29 However, this process has been limited to those 
cases where "[t]he value of the entire personal probate estate, 
wherever located, does not exceed $15,000."30 And therein lies the 
problem. Anecdotal testimony abounds regarding the number of 
instances in which an estate could be administered outside of the 
probate process but for the presence of one or more claims to per-
sonal property which, though of a relatively modest value, are not 
covered by any of Virginia's asset-specific probate avoidance stat-
utes. Such cases present the kind of problem that the Act's ge-
neric coverage was designed to remedy. But the Act could not be 
utilized in many of these cases because the value of the decedent's 
"entire personal probate estate,'' as opposed to the claim in ques-
tion, exceeded $15,000. Thus, the 2006 amendment, which in-
creases the Act's ceiling to $50,000, 31 will give the Act more of an 
22. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
23. Act of Mar. 15, 1981, ch. 281, 1981 Va. Acts 322 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
24. Act of Mar. 19, 2001, ch. 368, 2001 Va. Acts 338 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-132.2(A)(l) (Rep!. Vol. 2002)). 
25. VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp 2006). 
26. Id. § 6.1-194.58 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
27. Id.§ 6.1-225.49 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
28. Id. § 64.1-123.l (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
29. Id. § 64.1-132.3 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
30. Id.§ 64.l-132.2(A)(l) (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
31. Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 280, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 64.l-132.2(A)(l) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
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opportunity to reach its original potential and bring much needed 
relief in a number of cases as soon as it becomes effective. 32 
Lastly, it should be noted that two asset-specific probate avoid-
ance statutes which are linked to the Act also will be affected by 
the 2006 amendment. Virginia Code section 51.1-164, which deals 
with payments from the Virginia Retirement System, was 
amended by the 2004 Session to change its ceiling from $10,000 
to "the maximum allowed in § 64.1-132.2,"33 and section 51-511, 
dealing with persons entitled to payment of insurance on the 
death of a person covered under the state employee insurance 
program, provides that "[p]ayment which otherwise would be 
made to the estate of an employee may be made in accordance 
with the provisions of§ 51.1-164."34 
D. Public Guardian or Conservator-Making Funeral 
Arrangements 
Virginia Code section 2.2-713 provides that a public guardian 
or conservator ("PG/C") for an incapacitated person has the same 
statutory powers as a person appointed by the court unless the 
court specifically provides to the contrary. 35 The 2006 Session 
amended this section to give a PG/C the authority to make fu-
neral, cremation or burial arrangements in two different fact 
situations36 : (1) "if the [PG/C] is not aware of any person that has 
been otherwise designated to make [such] arrangements" pursu-
ant to a burial power of attorney,37 or (2) "after the death of an 
incapacitated person if the next of kin of the incapacitated (sic) 
does not wish to make the arrangements and the [PG/C] has 
32. Unlike most legislation from the 2006 Session, which will become effective on July 
1, 2006, this provision has a delayed effective date of Jan. 1, 2007. Id. (codified as 
amended at Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
33. Act of Mar. 12, 2004, ch. 81, 2004 Va. Acts 145 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 51.1-164 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2006)). This development is noted in J. Rodney 
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 
447, 452-53 (2004). 
34. VA. CODE ANN.§ 51.1-511 (Repl. Vol. 2005). 
35. Id. § 2.2-713 (Supp. 2006). 
36. It would seem that the requirements of both of the statutory provisions recited in 
the following text should be satisfied prior to the empowerment of the PG/C, but the stat-
ute is not so written. 
37. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 854, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 2.2-713 (Supp. 2006)). The statutory provision authorizing the burial power of at-
torney is Virginia Code section 54.1-2825 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2006). 
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made a good faith effort to locate the next of kin."38 Interestingly, 
although the latter power grants the burial authority to the PG/C 
"after the death of an incapacitated person,"39 there is no such 
limitation in the former power, leading to the implication that it 
also might be exercised during the incapacitated person's life. 40 A 
further question left open by this legislation is its interaction 
with Virginia Code section 64.1-136, which provides that one who 
is nominated as the executor of a will is authorized to "provide for 
the burial of the testator" prior to qualifying in the clerk's office. 41 
Lastly, assuming that this burial power is a good idea, one won-
ders why it is restricted to a PG/C. Just because a private person 
happens to be serving as guardian or conservator doesn't neces-
sarily mean that the same needs will not also exist in a certain 
number of such cases. 
E. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act-Joint Custodians 
The Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ("UTMA"),42 enacted by 
Virginia in 1988, 43 and presently in force in fifty jurisdictions, 44 is 
a form-oriented hybrid between a trust and a guardianship that 
is designed to enable unrepresented consumers to make transfers 
to minors that will be recognized for both state property and fed-
eral tax purposes without any need for a court-appointed guard-
ian by vesting legal title in the minor45 while granting full man-
agement powers to a transferor-appointed custodian. 46 One of 
UTMA's major advantages is the ease and simplicity with which 
custodians thereunder can make transfers. As all of the custo-
dian's powers are spelled out in the code of an enacting state, 47 
38. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 854, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 2.2-713 (Supp. 2006)). 
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-713 (Supp. 2006). 
40. It is difficult to see any reason for such a difference but standard rules of statutory 
construction lead to this conclusion. 
41. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-136 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
42. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, SC U.L.A. 1 (2001). 
43. Act of Apr. 4, 198S, ch. 516, 19SS Va. Acts 626 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 31-37 
to -59 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006). This legislation is discussed in J. Rodney 
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 
759, 768-71 (19SS). 
44. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, SC U.L.A. 1, 1-2 (Supp. 2006). 
45. VA. CODE ANN.§ 31-47(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
46. Id.§ 31-49 (Repl. Vol. 2004). 
47. Id.§ 31-47(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004) ("By making a transfer, the transferor incorporates 
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the entity that a custodian asks to make a particular transfer can 
act with the highest level of certainty and safety by simply assur-
ing itself that the person before it is in fact the person identified 
on the ownership writing as the custodian. 48 Although UTMA has 
provisions for successor custodians, 49 for purposes of simplicity it 
provided that "only one person may be the custodian" at any 
given time. 50 However, even though all of UTMA's provisions 
were drafted upon this premise of sole custodianship, the 2006 
Session amended Virginia Code section 31-46 at the request of 
the Virginia Bankers Association to provide that "up to two per-
sons may be joint custodians."51 In an attempt to resolve the prob-
lems presented by forcing this square peg (i.e., joint custodians) 
into the Act's round hole (i.e., sole custodian), the amendment 
further provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified in any docu-
ment creating the custodial property, each joint custodian shall 
have full power and authority to act alone with respect to the cus-
todial property."52 
Regrettably, this apparently straight forward "solution" can 
create a significant problem for the unknowing consumer who 
makes a UTMA gift to joint custodians. It is likely that, when one 
joint custodian seeks to act alone, an entity requested to make a 
transfer will decline to take immediate action because this joint 
custodian will not have the power to act alone if it is "otherwise 
specified in any document creating the custodial property."53 And 
it would appear that the only way an entity can determine 
whether there is or is not such a specification therein will be by 
requiring the production of the creating document in question54 
in the disposition all the provisions of this chapter .... "). 
48. Id.§ 31-52 (Rep!. Vol. 2004). 
49. Id. §§ 31-39, -54 (Rep!. Vol. 2004). 
50. Id. § 31-46 (Rep!. Vol. 2004). 
51. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 657, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 31-46 (Cum. Supp. 2006)). The Association claimed that its member banks were 
receiving "numerous" requests from its married customers to serve jointly for their chil-
dren and that, upon being informed that this was not possible under Virginia law, they 
became unhappy with the banks. The amendment also provides that "[i]f either joint cus-
todian resigns, dies, becomes incapacitated, or is removed, then the remaining joint custo-
dian shall become sole custodian." Id. 
52. Id. 
53. VA. CODE ANN.§ 31-46 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
54. It should be noted that the amendment refers to the document creating the "cus-
todial property" as opposed to the document originally creating the custodianship itself. 
Thus, where assets have been added to a custodianship over time, there may be multiple 
documents creating the "custodial property," which may not all treat the power issue in 
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and, as front-line personnel in banks, brokerages, etc., typically 
have limited interpretive authority, it may also result in a refer-
ral to the entity's legal department for a final resolution. Thus, in 
a number of cases, UTMA's ease and simplicity will be compro-
mised by undue delay, and this problem will be exacerbated when 
the joint custodians move to one of the other forty-eight UTMA 
jurisdictions where there is no familiarity with this novel con-
cept. 55 For these reasons, as well as the general interpretive un-
certainty created throughout UTMA by the "square peg/round 
hole" impact of the amendment, it is believed that the prudent es-
tate planner will advise clients to avoid this new form of UTMA 
registration. 
F. Uniform Trust Code-Care of Animals 
A trust for an animal was not possible at common law because 
of the requirement that a trust have a beneficiary who could 
compel its performance in court. 56 However, there is some com-
mon-law authority for the recognition of a trust-like vehicle for 
the care of an animal which, though unenforceable, would be al-
lowed to function if the "trustee" was willing to carry out its pur-
poses. As the success of such a trust depended upon the honor of 
the trustee, as opposed to being a legally enforceable obligation, 
this became known as an "honorary" trust. 57 The 2005 Session 
reversed the original common law rule by providing that "[a] trust 
may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during 
the settlor's lifetime."58 Thus, it is surprising to see the 2006 Ses-
sion amend this legislation by providing, among other things, 
that in construing the document creating a trust for an animal 
the court shall "presume against the merely ... honorary nature 
of the disposition."59 
the same way. It is unknown whether third parties will require the production of all "cre-
ating" documents in such cases, but it is a likely possibility. 
55. Tennessee is the only other jurisdiction that permits joint custodians. TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 35-7-211 (2001). The Virginia amendment was taken from this Tennessee provi-
sion. 
56. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 35 (6th ed. 1987). 
57. Id. 
58. Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 935, 2005 Va. Acts 1793 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-
544.08(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
59. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 666, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-544.08(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). The omitted portion of the quoted language pro-
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Unfortunately, this is just one of the issues presented by this 
2006 legislation. Some of the others are: (1) The new language 
that trust funds may be used for burial expenses "as provided for 
in the instrument creating the trust"60 may create the negative 
implication that trust funds may not be so used if a trust instru-
ment fails to expressly provide therefor; (2) One of the 2006 
amendments provides that the person appointed to enforce the 
trust "shall have the rights of a trust beneficiary for the purpose 
of enforcing the trust, including receiving accountings, "61 while 
another provides that "[e]xcept as ordered by a court or required 
by the trust instrument, no ... periodic accounting . . . shall be 
required;"62 (3) Although the prohibition against a trustee com-
mingling personal and trust assets is a fundamental rule of trust 
law63 that has been codified in Virginia's Uniform Trust Code,64 
one of the 2006 amendments provides that "[e]xcept as ordered by 
a court or required by the trust instrument, no ... separate main-
tenance of funds ... shall be required;"65 and ( 4) In dealing with 
the disposition of trust property which exceeds that required for 
the animal's care after the settlor's death, the original language 
of Virginia Code section 55-544.08 provided for it to be distributed 
to the "settlor's successors in interest" in the absence of trust lan-
guage providing for a different result. 66 However, as amended by 
the 2006 legislation, this section now provides that (1) if the ani-
mal trust was created by a pre-residuary clause in a trust67 or 
will, any excess trust funds will be distributed to the residuary 
vides that the court shall also presume against the disposition's "precatory" nature. Id. 
However, precatory language is defined as that which "merely expresses a wish or recom-
mendation" that property given outright to a person be used in a particular way, and such 
language is "generally construed not to create a trust but instead to create at most an 
ethical obligation." BOGERT, supra note 56, § 19. This concept is not implicated here be-
cause the section assumes that a trust has in fact been created. 
60. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 666, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-544.0S(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
61. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-544.0S(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
62. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-544.0S(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
63. BOGERT, supra note 56, § 100. 
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-548.lO(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006) ("A trustee shall keep trust 
property separate from the trustee's own property."). 
65. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 666, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-544.0S(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
66. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-544.0S(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005). 
67. This provision creates a threshold problem because, although traditional will 
drafting contemplates all wills having a residuary clause, this is not true for all inter vivos 
trusts. And, if a trust does not have a residuary clause, it would follow that it could not 
have a "pre-residuary" clause. 
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beneficiaries named in the trust or will, 68 and (2) if the animal 
trust was created by the residuary clause in a trust69 or will, the 
excess "shall be distributed to the settlor's successors in inter-
est. "70 One rather obvious question raised by this provision is, 
Who is entitled to receive the excess when the provision is created 
by an inter vivos trust that has no "pre-residuary" or "residuary" 
clause?71 A second question arises when the trust is created by 
the residuary clause in a will that has other residuary beneficiar-
ies. 72 Does the term "successors in interest" identify the other re-
siduary beneficiaries or the testator's intestate successors? One 
might ordinarily think of the former, but the amendment's use of 
"residuary clause" to identify takers when the trust is created by 
a "pre-residuary clause" and "settlor's successors in interest" to 
identify takers when the trust is created "otherwise" (i.e., in the 
residuary clause) casts doubt upon such a construction. Although 
the foregoing is not an exhaustive listing of the problems created 
by this legislation, it is hoped that it is sufficient to convince the 
2007 Session that it needs to be clarified. 
G. Deceased Tenant-Landlord's Disposal of Personal Property 
New Virginia Code section 55-248.38:3 authorizes a landlord to 
dispose of the property of a deceased tenant/sole occupant located 
in the premises or in a landlord-provided storage area if (1) no 
personal representative has been appointed, and (2) the landlord 
gives ten days written notice (i) to the person identified to receive 
such notice in the rental application, lease or other document or, 
if no such person is identified, (ii) to the tenant in accordance 
with section 55-248.6. 73 The ten-day written notice must include a 
68. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 666, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-544.0S(E) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
69. As noted earlier, this provision creates a threshold problem because, although tra-
ditional will drafting contemplates all wills having a residuary clause, this is not true for 
all inter vivos trusts. 
70. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 666, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-544.0S(E) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). 
71. As noted earlier, if an inter vivos trust does not have a residuary clause, it cannot, 
by definition, have a pre-residuary clause. 
72. For example, Ts will might leave his residuary estate 40% to Brother Bob, 50% to 
Sister Sue, and 10% in trust to Fido, all to the chagrin of his closest kin, Son Sam. Fido's 
trust fails to provide for a taker of any trust assets remaining at Fido's death. Who gets 
these assets, Bob and Sue, or Sam? 
73. Act of Apr. 6, 2006, ch. 820, 2006 Va. Acts _(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
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statement that such property "would be treated as abandoned 
property and disposed of, if not claimed within 30 days in accor-
dance with the provisions of§ 55-248.38:1."74 The interaction of 
these ten-day and thirty-day periods is unclear. It also might be 
noted that, as no waiting period is provided, a landlord can give 
the ten-day notice on the day of a tenant's death. This seems 
more than a little premature, given that a security deposit ac-
companies many if not most tenancies. In addition, a certain 
amount of time can be expected to pass before the appointment of 
a personal representative in any case and, when a tenant dies in-
testate leaving two or more distributees who cannot agree upon 
which one will serve as administrator, the clerk cannot appoint 
an administrator until thirty days after the tenant's death. 75 It is 
difficult to see any imminent danger to the landlord's economic 
interests if a reasonable waiting period preceded the right to give 
the ten-day notice. This new law also seems rather harsh in that 
its utilization is not affected by the fact that the deceased tenant's 
rent already may be paid for some time into the future, or that 
someone is willing to keep it current pending the appointment of 
a personal representative. It is submitted that, absent significant 
changes, the commonwealth would be best served by the 2007 
Session repealing this provision in its entirety. 
H. Appointment of Administrator-Priorities 
The 2002 Session revised Virginia Code section 64.1-118 to pro-
vide who might qualify as an administrator during the first thirty 
days following a decedent's death, who might qualify after thirty 
days have passed, and who might qualify after sixty days have 
passed. 76 The 2006 Session further amended this section to pro-
248.38:3 (Cum. Supp. 2006)). Interestingly, the referenced code section provides that "[a) 
person 'notifies' or 'gives' a notice or notification to another by taking steps reasonably cal-
culated to inform another person whether or not the other person actually comes to know 
of it." VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-248.6(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003). Notwithstanding the forgiving nature 
of the "whether or not" language of this provision, it remains difficult to see how one takes 
"steps reasonably calculated to inform" a decedent of anything. 
74. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-248.38:3 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
75. During the first thirty days following the intestate's death, the clerk may grant 
administration [only) (1) to a sole distributee or his designee or (2) in the absence of a sole 
distributee, to any distributee or his designee who presents written waivers of right to 
qualify from all other competent distributees. Id.§ 64.1-118(A)(l) (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
76. Act of Mar. 22, 2002, ch. 197, 2002 Va. Acts 262 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 64.l-118(A)(l)-(3) (Repl. Vol. 2002)). This development is discussed in J. Rodney 
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vide that "[a]fter 45 days have passed since the intestate's death, 
the clerk may grant administration to any nonprofit charitable 
organization that operated as a conservator or guardian for the 
decedent at the time of his death."77 
Ill. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
A. Augmented Estate-Waiver-Separately Maintained-
Insurance-Attorney Fees 
In the first of four augmented estate holdings in Dowling v. 
Rowan, 78 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the spe-
cific language of the premarital agreement between Husband 
("H'') and Wife ("W') was sufficient to waive H's rights to an elec-
tive share, exempt property, and a family allowance in Ws sepa-
rate property that was listed in the agreement's appendices. 79 
The second issue focused on H's augmented estate rights in cer-
tain Peruvian real estate that W acquired by intestate succession 
during their marriage. The statute defining the augmented estate 
provides for the value of property gratuitously received from third 
parties to be excluded from the recipient's augmented estate "to 
the extent such property, income, or proceeds were maintained by 
the decedent as separate property."80 In determining the meaning 
of "separately maintained" in this statute, a matter of first im-
pression, the court disagreed with H's contention that it "re-
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 
357, 357-59 (2002). 
77. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 724, 2006 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 64.1-118(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006)). This right is subject to the qualification that 
(i) [l)f, during the first 45 days following the intestate's death, any distributee 
notifies the clerk of an intent to qualify after the 45-day period has elapsed, 
the clerk shall not appoint any such organization administrator until the 
clerk has given all such distributees an opportunity to be heard, and (ii) such 
organization certifies that it has made a diligent search to find an address for 
any sole distributee and has given not less than 30 days notice by certified 
mail of its intention to apply for administration to the last known address or 
addresses of the distributee discovered or, alternatively, that it has not been 
able to find any such address. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-118(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006). However, "[q)ualification of such or-
ganization is not subject to challenge on account of a failure to have made the certification 
herein required. Id. 
78. 270 Va. 510, 621 S.E.2d 397 (2005). 
79. Id. at 518, 621 S.E.2d at 400-01. 
80. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(B)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
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quire[d] physical repair or maintenance upon the property," and 
concluded that it "refers to keeping a legal interest in the prop-
erty separate."81 Accordingly, as H admitted that W "did nothing 
with regard to these properties,'' the court held that their value 
was excluded from her augmented estate. 82 The third issue fo-
cused on two term life insurance policies, not listed in the pre-
marital agreement, that W transferred to an irrevocable trust for 
her daughter three years prior to Ws death. 83 The statute defin-
ing the augmented estate includes irrevocable gifts made during 
the calendar year of one's death, or during any of the five preced-
ing calendar years, "to the extent that the aggregate value of the 
transfers to the donee exceeds $10,000 in that calendar year."84 
This statute also provides that "[t]he value of an insurance policy 
that is irrevocably transferred during the lifetime of a decedent is 
the cost of a comparable policy on the date of transfer or, if such a 
policy is not readily available, the policy's interpolated terminal 
reserve."85 H argued for the inclusion of the two policies at their 
face values because the "evidence of a 'comparable policy' [was] 
not available for the date of transfer, and there was no interpo-
lated terminal reserve."86 The court rejected this argument as an 
attempt to rewrite the statute and refused to include any insur-
ance value in Ws augmented estate because H, who had the bur-
den of proof, had "failed to prove the $10,000 threshold to trigger 
the 'pull back rule' in the statute."87 Lastly, H, who was the ex-
ecutor of Ws estate, and an attorney, claimed legal fees relating 
both to the general administration of Ws estate and to the aug-
81. Dowling, 270 Va. at 519, 621 S.E.2d at 401. The court also noted that domestic 
relations law provides that a married person's separate property: 
(W]ill retain its "separate" status for purposes of equitable distribution unless 
one of several circumstances transmutes the nature of the property, such as 
commingling separate assets with marital assets or retitling the property in 
the joint names of the spouses. Code§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(d), (e), and (f). Since the 
primary purpose of the equitable distribution statute is to provide a fair 
manner for classifying assets accumulated during a marriage, we find that 
this body of law is sufficiently analogous to the issue at hand to inform our 
decision. 
Id. at 520, 621 S.E.2d at 401 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)-(f) (Cum. 
Supp. 2006)). 
82. Id. at 520, 621 S.E.2d at 401-02. 
83. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 402. 
84. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-16.l(A)(3)(d) (Rep!. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
85. Id. § 64.1-16.l(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
86. Dowling, 270 Va. at 521, 621 S.E.2d at 402. 
87. Id. 
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mented estate matter. However, following the '"American rule' 
which embodies the principle that each litigant must pay his own 
attorney's fees in the absence of a statute or contractual provision 
that would shift the burden,"88 the court affirmed the trial court's 
allowance of the former and denial of the latter because they were 
occasioned by H's personal interests and not "'necessary' to settle 
the estate."89 
B. Trust Interpretation-Early Vesting Presumption 
In Schmidt v. Wachovia Bank, 90 the wills of Husband ("H'') and 
Wife ("W''), which created testamentary trusts for their two chil-
dren for their lives, did not make any specific gift of remainders 
thereafter but each contained a standard contingency clause pro-
viding in part that property not "'disposed of by this will, shall 
pass to and descend to my heirs at law."'91 Following the death of 
the second child, the trustee sought the aid and direction of the 
court to determine whether the remainder interests under these 
contingency clauses vested at the time of H's and W's deaths, re-
spectively, or at the time of the second child's death. 92 Applying 
settled law to the stipulated facts of this case, and finding no 
clear language of an expressed intent to postpone vesting to some 
future time, the majority of the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied the long-standing presumption of early vesting and affirmed 
the trial court's holding that the remainders in question vested at 
each testator's death. 93 
88. Id. at 521-22, 621 S.E.2d at 402. 
89. Id. at 523, 621 S.E.2d at 403. 
90. 271 Va. 20, 624 S.E.2d 34 (2006). 
91. Id. at 23, 624 S.E.2d at 36. 
92. Id. The trustee attempted to participate in the appeal, arguing in favor of the trial 
court's application of the early vesting rule. But it was dismissed as an appellee because 
"Wachovia, however, received the aid and guidance that it had sought in the trial court 
and, therefore, does not have standing to so act. Moreover, a trustee cannot litigate the 
claims ofone set of legatees against the others." Id. at 24 n.1, 624 S.E.2d at 37 n.1. 
93. Id. at 26, 624 S.E.2d at 38. II's and Ws wills both contained standard spendthrift 
language, and one dissenting Justice believed that "it defies logic and reason that the Tes-
tators would create spendthrift trusts and, at the same time, intend to vest [one of the 
children] with the corpora thereof," which would be the result under the early vesting rule. 
Id. at 27, 624 S.E.2d at 39 (Stephenson, J., dissenting). 
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C. Will Contract-Mutual and Reciprocal Wills 
The case of Plunkett u. Plunkett 94 "concern[ed] the proper con-
struction of a marital agreement and two mutual and reciprocal 
wills, all of which were executed simultaneously."95 Following 
Husband's death, his children sought to have a constructive trust 
imposed on his separate property, claiming that his testamentary 
disposition thereof "was inconsistent with his intent, the [marital] 
Agreement, and [his] 'prior relationship with and devotion to his 
children."'96 The trial court granted this relief after determining 
that the agreement was ambiguous97 and then construing it in 
the light of the children's extrinsic evidence. However, applying 
established principles oflaw, the Supreme Court of Virginia, con-
cluding that "[t]he terms of this Agreement and the wills incorpo-
rated therein are not ambiguous and can be harmonized," re-
versed the trial court and entered final judgement in favor of 
Wife. 98 
D. Augmented Estate-Group Life Insurance and Retirement 
Benefits 
In Sexton u. Cornett, 99 Husband ("H') changed the beneficiary 
of his Virginia Retirement System ("VRS") administered group 
life insurance and retirement benefits from Wife ("W') to Sister 
(''S") and Niece ("N') two months before his death. 100 When W 
sought a portion of the value of these assets as a part of her 
rights in Hs augmented estate, the issue before the court was the 
interplay between that body of law and certain exemption stat-
utes providing (1) that "'[t]he insurance provided for in this chap-
ter [VRS] ... and all proceeds therefrom shall be exempt from 
94. 271Va.162, 624 S.E.2d 39 (2006). 
95. Id. at 164, 624 S.E.2d at 40. 
96. Id. at 166, 624 S.E.2d at 41. 
97. "The trial court's opinion letter does not expressly state that the Agreement is 
ambiguous or that resort to extrinsic evidence was necessary. Nonetheless, the fact that 
such evidence was considered and was apparently deemed necessary to the trial court's 
judgment implicitly indicates that such a finding occurred." Id. at 166 n.2, 624 S.E.2d at 
41 n.2. 
98. Id. at 169-70, 624 S.E.2d at 43. 
99. 271 Va. 251, 623 S.E.2d 898 (2006). 
100. Id. at 254, 623 S.E.2d at 900. 
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levy, garnishment, and other legal process,"' 101 (2) that "'[r]etire-
ment allowances and other benefits accrued or accruing to any 
person under this title [VRS] ... shall not be subject to execution, 
attachment, garnishment, or any other process whatsoever,'" 102 
and (3) that all group life insurance is similarly exempt. 103 The 
court noted that these statutes "have been a part of the law of 
Virginia since 1960, 1952, and 1934, respectively,"104 observed 
that "[u]ndoubtedly, much legal advice has been given and many 
estate plans have been made in reliance upon them,'' 105 and then 
stated that the question before it was whether these statutes 
"were partially repealed by implication when the augmented es-
tate laws were enacted in 1990."106 
101. Id. at 255-56, 623 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-510 (Repl. Vol. 
2005)). The quoted statute was not mentioned in the trial court's opinion or in the brief of 
any party. 
102. Id. at 256, 623 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.4 (Repl. Vol. 
2005)). The quoted statute was not mentioned in the trial court's opinion or in the brief of 
any party. 
103. Virginia Code section 38.2-3339 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006) was quoted 
in full by the court in Sexton, as follows: 
§ 38.2-3339. Exemption of group life insurance policies from legal process. -
No group life insurance policy, nor its proceeds, shall be liable to attachment, 
garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied 
by any legal or equitable process or operation oflaw, to pay any debt or liabil-
ity of any person insured under the policy, or his beneficiary, or any other 
person who has a right under the policy, either before or after payment. If the 
proceeds of a group life insurance policy are not made payable to a named 
beneficiary, the proceeds shall not constitute a part of the insured person's 
estate for the payment of his debts. 
271 Va. at 256, 623 S.E.2d at 901. 
104. Sexton, 271 Va. at 256, 623 S.E.2d at 901. 
105. Id. No such claims were made in the brief of any party. When the question was 
posed to a group of over one hundred lawyers from all across the Commonwealth who were 
attending Virginia's premiere estate planning conference at the Tides Inn, in April 2006, 
none of them had based an estate plan upon any of these statutes nor were they aware of 
any other lawyer who had. 
106. Id. The portion of the court's decision concluding that "if the augmented estate 
laws are read in isolation, the assets held by these beneficiaries, as donees of the dece-
dent's property within the year prior to his death, are clearly subject to the widow's claim," 
Id. at 255, 623 S.E.2d at 900, is omitted from the text because, although the court cited the 
wrong authority for its conclusion, this error did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The court based includability upon Virginia Code section 64.1-16.l(A)(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 
2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006) but this provision deals with irrevocable gifts, and H's benefici-
ary designations in this case were revocable. Sexton, 271 Va. at 255, 623 S.E.2d at 900. It 
should be noted that the court correctly applied this statutory authority in Dowling v. 
Rowan, where, instead of making a revocable insurance beneficiary designation, the in-
sured transferred the insurance in question to an irrevocable trust. 270 Va. 510, 520-21, 
621 S.E.2d 397, 402 (2005). The Dowling case is discussed supra Part III.A. 
The correct inclusion section for revocable transfers, such as the insurance beneficiary 
designation in this case, is Virginia Code section 64.1-16.l(A)(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & 
340 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:321 
Noting that implied repeal is not favored, and that the older in-
surance exemption statutes are special in their operation while 
the more recent augmented estate statutes are general in their 
application to all property, the court decided to 
[A]dhere to a rule of construction that where there are two statutes, 
the earlier special and the later general, and the terms of the general 
are broad enough to include the subject matter provided for in the 
special, a presumption arises that the earlier special act is to be con-
sidered as remaining in effect as an exception to the later general 
law.101 
However, although this presumption is rebuttable, and although 
the opinion notes that "[t]he courts assume that a legislative 
body, when enacting new legislation, was aware of existing laws 
pertaining to the same subject matter," 108 the opinion fails to 
mention the following statutory language, defining "estate" and 
"property" in the general, i.e., the augmented estate, statutes: 
As used in this section, the terms "estate" and "property" shall in-
clude insurance policies, retirement benefits exclusive of federal so-
cial security benefits, annuities, pension plans, deferred compensa-
tion arrangements, and employee benefit plans to the extent owned 
by, vested in, or subject to the control of the decedent on the date of 
his death or the date of an irrevocable transfer by him during his 
lifetime. 109 
It is respectfully submitted that, in resolving the conflict be-
tween the general and specific statutes before it, the purpose and 
impact of this language found in the section defining the aug-
mented estate110 should have been discussed in light of the gen-
eral purpose and public policy of the augmented estate legisla-
tion. But this definitional provision is not even mentioned in the 
opinion, even though it was called to the court's attention in the 
Brief of Appellant, m the Brief of Appellee, 112 and the Brief of 
Cum. Supp. 2006). The distinction is significant because inclusion of irrevocable transfers 
under section 64.1-16.l(A)(3)(d) is limited to transfers made "within the calendar year of 
the decedent's death or any of the five preceding calendar years to the extent that the ag-
gregate value of the transfers to the donee exceeds $10,000 in that calendar year," and 
there are no such time or monetary limitations applicable to revocable transfers included 
under section 64.1-16.l(A)(3)(b). 
107. Sexton, 271 Va. at 257, 623 S.E.2d at 901. 
108. Id. The quoted sentence continues "and intended to leave them undisturbed." Id. 
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.l(D) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). This lan-
guage, from the section defining the augmented estate, also appears in the section dealing 
with the satisfaction of rights thereunder. Id.§ 64.1-16.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 
2006). 
110. Id.§ 64.1-16.l(D) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2006). 
111. Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Sexton, 271 Va. 251, 623 S.E.2d 898 (No. 050643). 
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Guardian ad litem for N. 113 Lastly, after applying the orthodox 
presumption, the court concluded that the insurance and retire-
ment benefits in this case 
[D]id not become a part of the augmented estate, that their value 
should not be added to it, 114 and that the beneficiaries are not sub-
ject to any claims for contribution. Although we do not agree with 
the reasoning expressed by the trial court in reachin~ its decision, its 
holding was correct and we will affirm the judgment. 15 
E. Holographic Will-Entirely in T's Handwriting 
The issue in Berry u. Trible 116 was "whether the circuit court 
erred in confirming a jury verdict that a handwritten phrase and 
notation, made on a typewritten draft of a will containing many 
other handwritten entries, constituted a valid holographic 
will." 117 These handwritten markings were so numerous, varied, 
and scattered that, instead of attempting to describe them, the 
court took the somewhat unusual step of attaching a copy of the 
page in question to its opinion. 118 After surveying the relevant 
law, the court decided to "take this opportunity to reaffirm [the 
following two] basic principles"119 : 
We hold that a holographic will may only be established upon con-
sideration of all handwritten entries made by the testator on a 
document, not upon consideration of only portions of those handwrit-
ten entries selected by the will's proponent .... We further hold that 
a purported holographic will is invalid if the handwritten entries are 
interwoven or joined to the typewritten material on the document, or 
continue from the typewritten material in physical form, by refer-
ence, or in sequence of thought. 120 
112. Brief of Appellee at 2, Sexton, 271 Va. 251, 623 S.E.2d 898 (No. 050643). 
113. BriefofGuardian ad litem at 3, Sexton, 271 Va. 251, 623 S.E.2d 898 (No. 050643). 
114. The trial court had "ruled that the value of the life insurance proceeds and the 
value of the retirement benefits should be added to the augmented estate." Sexton, 271 Va. 
at 254, 623 S.E.2d at 900. "No cross-error [was) assigned to this ruling." Brief of Appellant 
supra note 111, at 5. Indeed, both appellees agreed therewith. See Brief of Appellee, supra 
note 112, at 2; Briefof Guardian ad litem, supra note 113, at 3. 
115. Sexton, 271 Va. at 257, 623 S.E.2d at 902. 
116. 271 Va. 289, 626 S.E.2d 440 (2006). 
117. Id. at 293, 626 S.E.2d at 441. 
118. Id. at 303, 626 S.E.2d at 448. 
119. Id. at 301, 626 S.E.2d at 446. 
120. Id. 
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The court then held that "[a]pplying these principles, we con-
clude that the proffered holographic will fails as a matter of 
law."121 
F. Trusts-Accounting 
The issue in Campbell v. Harmon 122 was "whether the personal 
representative of the estate of a decedent who was a lifetime 
beneficiary of a trust has standing to seek an accounting from the 
trust fiduciaries." 123 Husband ("II''), who was the sole income 
beneficiary of an inter vivos trust created by his deceased wife for 
the fifteen years preceding his death in 1999, received distribu-
tions therefrom but never received any accountings from its trus-
tees. 124 In response to a petition by !I's executor to compel an ac-
counting by the trustees in connection with this income interest, 
the court reversed the decision below, concluding that "[a] dece-
dent's personal representative has standing under the plain lan-
guage of Code § 8.01-25 to maintain a cause of action existing at 
the time of the decedent's death, 125 which includes the right to 
compel an accounting under Code§ 8.01-31 from the trustees of a 
trust of which the decedent was a beneficiary."126 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that 
the 2007 Session should (1) repeal or clarify the amendments re-
121. Id. 
122. 271 Va. 590, 628 S.E.2d 308 (2006). 
123. Id. at 593, 628 S.E.2d at 309. 
124. Id. at 594, 628 S.E.2d at 309-10. 
125. In an earlier part of its opinion, the court stated that "[n)o issue was raised by the 
parties or the trial court contesting whether [HJ had a cause of action for an accounting 
prior to his death. We will therefore assume, without deciding, that a cause of action did 
accrue to [HJ by virtue of the Trustees' failure to account and that such failure was the 
necessary injury or damage by which a cause of action accrued." Id. at 597 n.5, 628 S.E.2d 
at 311 n.5. 
126. Id. at 601, 628 S.E.2d at 314. However, in regard to a second accounting regarding 
the Trustees' alleged actions in connection with certain personal property that occurred 
after Hs death, the court affirmed the trial court's denial because "[HJ clearly had no 
cause of action against the Trustees during his lifetime" in regard thereto that could sur-
vive under Virginia Code section 8.01-25 (Rep!. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006). Campbell, 
271 Va. at 601, 628 S.E.2d at 313-14. 
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lating to (i) trusts and the tenancy by the entirety127 and (ii) a 
landlord's disposal of a deceased tenant's personal property; 128 (2) 
clarify the amendments relating to (i) the burial authority of a 
public guardian or conservator, 129 and (ii) trusts for the care of 
animals; 130 and (3) enact legislation clarifying its original intent 
that the presence of a creditor immunity provision in a statute 
does not prevent the value of property covered by that statute 
from being included in the value of a decedent's augmented es-
tate.131 
127. See supra Part H.B. 
128. See supra Part ILG. 
129. See supra Part H.D. 
130. See supra Part H.F. 
131. See supra Part HI.D. 
